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Source: *Transactions of the American Philological Association (1974-2014)*, 1979, Vol. 109 (1979), pp. 199-214

Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/284058>

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## GAIUS CAESAR'S MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN THE EAST\*

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Augustus' intentions for the public lives of his adopted sons, C. and L. Caesar, are obscure. The premature deaths of the youths precipitated this general obscurity about them as about Augustus' succession plan. Gaius is the better known for having enjoyed a greater prominence over a somewhat longer lifespan: *Ambo fato breves, sed alter inglorius* (Florus 2.32.42). Unfortunately our evidence is no less scanty about critical events leading to Gaius' death than about Augustus' intentions for his sons' careers. The present paper treats the evidence for Gaius' military activities in the East from his consulship of A.D. 1 until his death in February A.D. 4. If we keep Gaius Caesar as our primary focus, a consistent interpretation will emerge to indicate his service to the *princeps* in these years.

Augustus had carefully managed the civic appearance of both his sons: crossing Augustus' purposes, in fact, elicited his public displeasure (Dio 54.27.1 and 55.9.1–3; Suet. *Aug.* 56.2).<sup>1</sup> The *princeps* carefully fostered a military image for Gaius. Although imperial influence may be suspected when the *equites* acclaimed Gaius and Lucius each *princeps iuventutis*, in 5 and 2 B.C. respectively, still no one doubts the militarism of other honors that belong exclusively to Gaius, viz. his parading with the Rhine army in 8 B.C. (Dio 55.6.1–6) and the coins which show him armed and on horseback

\*A much earlier version of this argument benefited from the criticisms of J. Cody, R. Mellor and A. E. Raubitschek. Another version was presented to The Johns Hopkins Philological Association; a typescript of the present draft was read by Sir Ronald Syme, for whose comments *per litteras* I am grateful. The anonymous referees of the Association have also been helpful.

Dio is cited from the edition of U. Boissvain, *Casii Dionis Cocceiani Historiarum Romanarum Quae Supersunt* (Berlin 1895–1901; reprint, Berlin 1955) 3 vols.; the epitomators are indispensable for this period. Velleius is cited from A. J. Woodman, *Velleius Paterculus: The Tiberian Narrative* (2.94–131) (Cambridge 1977); this serviceable and welcome work with its textual and literary basis should stimulate new researches on this author.

<sup>1</sup>As a result the ancients sometimes overinterpreted, cf. βουλῆθεις δὲ δὴ τρόπον τινὰ μάλλον αὐτοὺς σωφρονίσαι (Dio 55.9.4) or *specie recusantis* (Tac. *Ann.* 1.3).

(*BMCRR* II 443–44, nos. 221–25 = *BMCRE* I, Aug. nos. 498–502). The fragmentary historical record urges caution in distinguishing on these grounds between the youths in Augustus' policies; but Gaius' later adventures in military diplomacy are not entirely accidental and show traces of a directed evolution from childhood to young manhood.<sup>2</sup>

## BACKGROUND

In 20 B.C. Augustus had personally negotiated in the East with Phraates IV of Parthia, and Phraates had returned the captured standards of three Roman armies (Dio 54.8.1–3). The resulting treaty was struck very much on Roman terms as Augustus' enthusiastic response shows. For the time being, Parthia had ceded its claims in Armenia and in the year of this treaty Tiberius led an expeditionary force there and, after the collapse of a minimal resistance, installed the Roman nominee, Tigranes II, on the throne (Dio 54.9.5–7; Suet. *Tib.* 9.1; Joseph. *AJ* 15.105).<sup>3</sup> Phraates had withdrawn his support for the Armenian rebellion and, with the possible but doubtful exception of brief violence in 6 B.C. (Dio 55.9.4), he adhered to this policy until his death in 2 B.C.

The bloodless intervention in Armenia and the conciliatory attitude of the Parthians were ignored at Rome, and in 19 B.C. Augustus' mints began to proclaim on some of his best-known coins that Armenia had been recovered (e.g., *BMCRR* II 548–50, nos. 301–308) and the standards retaken from the Parthians (e.g., *BMCRR* II 25–26, nos. 4396–4406 = *BMCRE* I, Aug. nos. 410, 412, 414–19, 421–23). Augustus took his ninth imperatorial salutation<sup>4</sup> and, if all this left doubt [!], he later monumentalized his coercion of the Parthians in his *Res Gestae*, ch. 29.

One important event in the period between 19 and 6 B.C. illustrates Phraates' increasing dependence on Rome. About 10/9 B.C. Phraates delivered his legitimate heirs to M. Titius, then governor of Syria.<sup>5</sup> They

<sup>2</sup>F. E. Romer, "A Numismatic Date for the Departure of C. Caesar?," *TAPA* 108 (1978) 187–202, discusses this and related problems. To the evidence for the public advertisement of Gaius' military mission may be added the altar from Vicus Sandalarius, now in the Uffizi, as discussed by my colleague, J. Pollini, *Studies in Augustan "Historical" Reliefs*, diss., University of California (Berkeley 1978) 304–309 with notes. One side of this altar shows Augustus, Livia and Gaius at the *tripudium* or military auspices before Gaius' departure; an inscription clearly dates the altar to 2 B.C.

<sup>3</sup>Contradictory and elliptical sources have made the Armenian succession a perennially vexed question. Modern discussions derive from T. Mommsen, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* (Berlin 1883?) 109–17. In general, I agree with the revised chronology of D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (Princeton 1950) 1476 and II 1339, note 25, but differ with him on the significance of individual changes of ruler.

<sup>4</sup>T. D. Barnes, "The Victories of Augustus," *JRS* 64 (1974) 21–22.

<sup>5</sup>On this dating, cf. G. W. Bowersock, *Augustus and the Greek World* (Oxford 1965) 22.

were to live at Rome. Whether this extreme measure was agreed to in 20 B.C. or, more likely, was prompted by later circumstances, it gave Augustus nominal custody of the Parthian succession. The feudal hierarchy in Parthia kept its emperor vulnerable to powerful cliques of barons and the transfer of the legitimate heirs points first to Phraates' difficulties at home. Since the well-being of the heirs was at stake, this gesture to Rome perhaps anticipated, or even provoked, the dynastic opposition that culminated in the coup of 2 B.C.<sup>6</sup> As long as his legitimate heirs were in Italy, Phraates had compelling reason to support Roman foreign policy in the East.

In 6 B.C. Tiberius received his second commission to resolve turmoil in Armenia but, amid political infighting at Rome, he refused his orders and sequestered himself at Rhodes (Dio 55.9.4–5; Suet. *Tib.* 9.3). What had happened in Armenia is elusive but no Roman, including Pompey who introduced the *imperium Romanum* there, had assured its orderly succession. In 6 B.C., or shortly before, Tigranes II died and the succession failed again, in part because of renewed Parthian interest (cf. Dio 55.9.4). Parthian involvement causes some surprise because it violated the treaty of 20 B.C. at a time when the heirs to the throne were available to Augustus as political hostages (they could be little else under the circumstances); the Parthian activities in Armenia were therefore not at Phraates' direction.<sup>7</sup> The new crisis in Armenia was serious enough to provoke a special command for Rome's most prestigious general, although the conditions in Parthia were perhaps not yet entirely clear to Augustus or his advisers. In appointing Tiberius, Augustus had responded as he thought the situation required.

Although Augustus understood that he was being abandoned by Tiberius (Suet. *Tib.* 10.2) and that his stepson would not campaign between

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note 6, for his observation on Livy, *Per.* 141; cf. also N. C. Debevoise, *A Political History of Parthia* (Chicago 1938) 143–44, which has also been accepted by R. Syme, *History in Ovid* (Oxford 1978) 32, note 2. (Regrettably, Syme's book came into my hands too late to be used systematically here.) The whole problem of interpreting the transfer of the Arsacid princes to Rome is complicated by the loss of even the epitomes for Books 136 and 137 of Livy which treated the period 25–15 B.C.

<sup>6</sup>Ov. *Ars Am.* 195–96 perhaps shows that the coup had already occurred on 12 May 2 B.C. (cf. A. S. Hollis, *Ovid: Ars Amatoria Book I* [Oxford 1977] *ad loc.*), but not that Phraates had yet made demands. Magie (above, note 3) II 1344, note 44, cites Joseph. *AJ* 18.39 f. and the numismatic evidence which points to 2 B.C.

<sup>7</sup>For references and discussion, Magie (above, note 3) I 482–83 and II 1344, note 43. Magie accepts Joseph. *AJ* 18.42, *Φραατάκης δὲ μόνος ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τρεφόμενος*, but this seems to be Josephus' inference from circumstances. If Phraates raised a bastard for this purpose, he was remarkably shortsighted about the legitimate heirs' presence at Rome; Strabo 16.28 and Tac. *Ann.* 2.1 show the importance of legitimacy for the Parthian throne.

6 and 2 B.C. (Suet. *Tib.* 10.2), Parthian observers might have been less sure. Until Phraates' death the implied threat of Tiberius' presence at Rhodes may have helped to restrain Parthian aggression in Armenia.<sup>8</sup> Whatever provoked Tiberius' command in 6 B.C. had subsided with his presence nearby; that violation of the existing treaty subsequently appeared as a minor one which Augustus' prompt action had checked.<sup>9</sup> These circumstances will help to explain our sources' silence about turmoil in Armenia between 6 and 2 B.C.<sup>10</sup> Therefore in 2 B.C. Augustus felt confident in dispatching the elder of his adopted sons (with a very capable general staff<sup>11</sup>) to impose a solution in the grand and unencumbered manner of Tiberius in 20 B.C.

As Gaius set out in 2 B.C., a renewal of the Armenian crisis of four years earlier was not expected. Ovid knew (*Ars Am.* 1.177–228) that Parthians,

<sup>8</sup>I am cautious here. The literary evidence does not indicate that Tiberius officially took up his *imperium* by leaving *paludatus* from the city for his *provincia*. But from external signs B. Levick, *Tiberius The Politician* (London 1976) 40, suggests that Tiberius had *imperium maius* as well as *tribunicia potestas*. If so, then not until May 2 B.C. when Gaius departed Rome for the East could the Parthians be sure that Augustus was underestimating them. When Tiberius' powers (the *tribunicia potestas*, if nothing else) expired in 1 B.C., he was given an empty office, *quasi legatus*, as a favor to his mother (Suet. *Tib.* 12.1) and became a virtual exile (Suet. *Tib.* 13.1).

<sup>9</sup>Velleius' different view of things is a case of his special pleading: *Sensit terrarum orbis digressum a custodia Neronem urbis: nam et Parthus desciscens a societate Romana adiecit Armeniae manum et Germania aversis dormitoris sui oculis rebellavit* (2.100.1). Before Velleius pursues the Parthian and German reactions, the only two examples of this world-shaking event, his narrative is interrupted by the account of Julia's disgrace in 2 B.C. Tiberius did not, technically speaking, abandon his *custodia urbis* until the expiration of his powers in 1 B.C.; this should have antedated the Parthian and German reactions. Velleius himself dates the German rebellion to A.D. 2 (2.104.2) while Dio 55.10a.2 points to A.D. 1. (Velleius may be forcing a coincidence.) When he picked up the Parthian situation again, he moved to the peace of A.D. 2 and its aftermath. Naturally, he overlooks the roots of the crisis which we are investigating.

<sup>10</sup>To which must be added other problems of the record: (1) a Graeco-Roman ethnocentricity, already noticed in antiquity, that precluded barbarian affairs from having much interest of their own and (2) the loss of a folio from our text of Dio which has obscured his account of 6 B.C.–A.D. 4. On Velleius, cf. above, note 9.

<sup>11</sup>At various times the general staff included: M. Lollius as *comes et rector* (Suet. *Tib.* 12.2); L. Licinius (*CIL* VI 1442), otherwise unknown, but cf. V. Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit* (Leipzig 1891–1904) II 744, note 22; L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (cf. Suet. *Nero* 5.1 and Gardthausen, *loc. cit.*, I 1133 where Suetonius' Cnaeus is corrected to Lucius); P. Sulpicius Quirinius (Tac. *Ann.* 3.48); and probably Juba II of Mauretania as historian (inferred from Pliny *HN* 6.141 and other circumstances). Aelius Sejanus (Tac. *Ann.* 4.1) was too young to have been a regular *comes* of Gaius although he could have served under him. A geographical report was prepared by Isidore of Charax (called Dionysius at Pliny *HN* 6.141 but see E. Herzfeld, "Sakastan," *AMI* 4 [1932] 4–8). Isidore's *Stathmoi Parthikoi* survives in part and treats trade routes east of the Euphrates.

Medes and Armenians all figured in Gaius' future, but his tongue-in-cheek tone proves no one expected real danger.<sup>12</sup> Any settlement in Armenia could be broadcast as a major defense of the eastern frontier just as had been done after the treaty of 20 B.C.<sup>13</sup> While Phraates retained power in Parthia, the Armenian succession could be managed by an inexperienced Roman youth relying on a talented general staff.

Before undertaking this assignment, Gaius made a grand tour, lasting something over a year and a half, through Greece, the lower Danube area and Anatolia.<sup>14</sup> This tour culminated in his consulship for A.D. 1 and his first action as consul was a minor campaign in Arabia Petraea (to be discussed below), a region that had not been completely stable during the last years of Herod the Great (d. 4 B.C.). After Herod's death Gaius had sat on the committee to decide the Judaeian succession;<sup>15</sup> this earlier visibility of his in eastern affairs would now be enhanced. (The importance of Gaius' eastern commission contrasts sharply with Lucius' projected service in Spain.<sup>16</sup>) Stated in its grandest terms, Gaius' present charge was to dramatize the continuity and stability of Roman frontier policy in the East.

The absence of a critical or potentially critical diplomatic situation in 2 B.C. explains both Augustus' complacency in dispatching his son and the long duration of the latter's journey from Rome to Syria. That his journey was instructional is suggested by Dio 55.10.17 (if this has been correctly placed in the text as most historians now assume) and Vell. 2.101.1; it simultaneously groomed him for the consulship, military leadership and his part in the succession. Much glory, even with few risks, would bring him recognition. Demonstrating the Roman presence at the frontier was meant

<sup>12</sup>R. Syme, "Lentulus and the Origins of Moesia," *JRS* 24 (1934) 137: "His mission did not, in fact, involve any serious war; and it might well be doubted whether Augustus intended that it should. None the less a show of force in dealing with the Parthians belonged to the best methods of diplomacy." Florus 2.32.43 implies the relative insignificance of the war Gaius ultimately waged in Armenia, *non incruento, non multo tamen certamine*.

<sup>13</sup>The reason for this emerges: the interrelated royal families in Parthia, Media Atropatene and Armenia were all involved whenever Rome acted in Armenia; alliances between any two of these against the third were usual and often shifted inconveniently (cf. Strabo 11.13.1-2). Successful intervention by Rome in Armenia meant the expectation of a lasting settlement.

<sup>14</sup>Romer (above, note 2) 201-202 with notes 34-39 gives the evidence with discussion. Troy should be added to Gaius' itinerary (*IGR* IV 205, now superseded by P. Frisch, *Die Inschriften von Ilion* [Bonn 1975] no. 87). *IGR* IV 248 has been replaced by R. Merkelbach, *Die Inschriften von Assos* (Bonn 1976) no. 13, which incorporates his previous work on this inscription. A. G. Woodhead kindly drew my attention to Frisch's and Merkelbach's new editions.

<sup>15</sup>Gaius attended the first session of this council (Joseph. *BJ* 2.25 and *AJ* 17.229), perhaps not the second (Joseph. *BJ* 2.81 and *AJ* 17.30).

<sup>16</sup>Romer (above, note 2) 200-201, notes 32-33.

as a safe and glorious introduction to active military life and to eastern politics. Parthian belligerence, however, illustrating the uncertainties of military diplomacy, frustrated these best-laid plans.

Unfortunately for his plans, Augustus' appointment of his untried son coincided with a coup in Parthia which brought the royal bastard Phrataces ("Little Phraates," i.e., Phraates V) to the throne.<sup>17</sup> No doubt active dissension preceding the coup also dissuaded the rebellious nobles from courting war with Rome. These same nobles, supporting the anti-Roman resistance in Armenia, seem to have challenged openly Phraates and his Roman policy in 6 B.C. External circumstances and increasing dissension should have mitigated this faction's anti-Roman operations in Armenia during the last years of Phraates' long rule (c. 38–2 B.C.). Within a year of Phraates' death, Tiberius' formal relations with Augustus expired with his commission (Suet. *Tib.* 12.1). The appointment of Gaius made the Romans appear more vulnerable in the East and the return of the Parthian heirs for execution or house arrest would ameliorate Phrataces' illegitimacy against "constitutional" claims.

Phrataces spent much of 1 B.C.–A.D. 1 (Dio 55.10.20) negotiating with Augustus. Acceptance of the Roman nominee in Armenia was his *quid pro quo* for the return of the legitimate Parthian heirs. Augustus' response was ridicule; he refused to address Phrataces as king.<sup>18</sup> Augustus retained the Parthian heirs and reaffirmed his plans for Armenia, thereby leaving Phrataces to make good his threats. Although Phrataces' hostility meant that Gaius' mission in Armenia could no longer be as straightforward as Tiberius' in 20 B.C., still the Arsacid princes, Gaius' general staff carefully chosen by Augustus, and time were all on the Roman side when Phrataces made his demands.

## ARABIA

It is usually assumed, and in fact quite likely, that Gaius became consul in Syria on 1 January A.D. 1 (although no ancient evidence explicitly states this); but that he was free to confront Phrataces or the Armenian issue is less likely, if not impossible, as G. W. Bowersock has recently seen.<sup>19</sup> A

<sup>17</sup>Cf. above, note 6. Gaius' long-planned journey was not planned long in response to Phrataces' belligerence. On the spelling of Phrataces' name I have followed Dio's practice (55.10.20), not Josephus' (*AJ* 18.40).

<sup>18</sup>Two could play at this: Phrataces wrote back styling Augustus simply as Caesar; he thereby recalled Antony's jibe, *qui omnia nomini debes* (Cic. *Phil.* 13.25), which no doubt had enjoyed wide circulation in the East.

<sup>19</sup>Dio's epitomator (55.10a.4) is not decisive for the date and place at which Gaius assumed

minor campaign in Arabia Petraea had to be fought first. Only Pliny the Elder has specific information about Gaius' *expeditio Arabica* and even he does not share the details.

Based on Pliny's remarks, Professor Bowersock persuasively argued as follows: C. Caesar spent a part of his consulship *ultra fines extremas populi Romani bellum gerens* (CIL XI 1421 = ILS 140) but the Armenian campaign to which convention has assigned this cannot have begun before A.D. 2 (Dio 55.10a.5). The erratically attested *expeditio Arabica*<sup>20</sup> seems to be the only available campaign which can be associated with his consulship. Pliny is explicit (HN 2.168): *Maiores quidem eius partem et orientis victoriae magni Alexandri lustrare usque in Arabicum sinum, in quo res gerente C. Caesare Augusti filio signa navium ex Hispaniensibus naufragiis feruntur agnita*. He knows more (HN 6.160): *Romana arma solus in eam terram adhuc intulit Aelius Gallus ex equestri ordine; nam C. Caesar Augusti filius prospexit tantum Arabiam*. No other campaign is known from his consulship to explain the claim of the Pisan cenotaph. This Arabian campaign was fought near an *Arabicus sinus* and, since Gaius merely peeked at Arabia where Aelius Gallus waged war, this must mean the Gulf of <sup>c</sup>Aqaba at the head of the Arabian peninsula. As consul, Gaius prosecuted a war in A.D. 1 in the Nabataean kingdom not against Nabataeans but against "nomadic invaders pushing northward from Saudi Arabia."

The gist of this argument must be right and one further piece of evidence may be given its place. A visit to Egypt by C. Caesar is seldom questioned, although an elliptical reference by a late Christian polemicist, Orosius, is the only evidence for it. This visit has been conceived as a part of Gaius' routine tour before his consulship and his purpose as a preliminary reconnaissance for a projected Arabian campaign which he never waged because of wretched luck in Armenia.<sup>21</sup> This is erroneous at least in part. If the alleged visit to Egypt is properly aligned in the record with the *expeditio*

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office: *ὑπατεύοντα* does not necessarily mean "beginning his consulship," cf. G. W. Bowersock, "A Report on Arabia Provincia," *JRS* 61 (1971) 227, note 53, and Woodman (above, note \*) 125 *ad* Vell. 2.101.1 in *Syriam missus*. Bowersock's discussion paraphrased here appears on pp. 227–28 of the same article.

<sup>20</sup>Bowersock (above, note 19) 227, notes 54–55, gives the evidence as Pliny HN 6.141, 160; 12.55–56; 32.10; and correcting the misprint in his note 54, *FGrH* III A 275, F 1–3. He omits Pliny HN 2.168 to which he apparently alludes twice (cf. *res gerens*, *Arabicus sinus*); Barnes (above, note 4) 23 and Syme (above, note 5) 10, note 5, need this reference to the *Arabicus sinus*.

<sup>21</sup>Gardthausen (above, note 11) I 1137 and *RE* X 426 suggested that Gaius was in Syria on 1



*Arabica* (and the rush of events in A.D. 1 and afterwards suggests as much), then on Pliny's evidence it cannot be assigned to an unrealized campaign.

Let us turn now to Orosius' remarks (7.3.4–5):

... Gaium nepotem suum Caesar Augustus ad ordinandas Aegypti Syriaeque provincias misit. Qui praeteriens ab Aegypto fines Palaestinae, apud Hierosolimam in templo dei tunc sancto et celebri adorare contempsit, sicut Suetonius Tranquillus refert. Quod Augustus ubi per eum conperit, pravo usus iudicio prudenter fecisse laudavit.

And to his source (Suet. *Aug.* 93) as well:

At contra non modo in peregranda Aegypto paulo deflectere ad visendum Apin supersedit, sed et Gaium nepotem, quod Iudaeum praetervehens apud Hierosolimam non supplicasset, conlaudavit.

The *communis opinio* holds that Gaius, in whatever capacity, visited Egypt (above, note 21). Although this assertion rests chiefly on Orosius, his remarks have not been scrutinized. Any discussion that proceeds on Orosius' authority, especially when he differs from his stated source, deserves argument; substantial disparity exists in three phrases: (1) *ad ordinandas Aegypti Syriaeque provincias*, (2) *ab Aegypto* and (3) *quod Augustus ubi per eum conperit*.<sup>22</sup> Since the passage has not drawn critical attention, the arguments for [phrase (3)] and against its authority [phrases (1) and (2)] will be discussed.

To accept Orosius' word as proof of Gaius' visit to Egypt, one must depend on a difficult argument. In the phrase *quod Augustus ubi per eum conperit*, *per eum* adds nuance to the obvious. (It may do no more.) The time for Augustus' praise was while the issue was current, i.e., with Gaius

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January A.D. 1; he was approved by D. Magie (above, note 3) I 482 and II 1343–44, note 42. On Gaius' supposed visit to Egypt and the northern Arabs, Gardthausen said (*RE* X 426) that "vielleicht schon Vorbereitungen getroffen wurden für eine arabische Expedition, die der armenischen folgen sollte." Consequently he misrepresented Gaius' consulship: "Dieses Jahr brauchte Gaius, um sich zunächst in Osten zu orientieren und sein Heer zusammenzustellen für den armenischen Feldzug." J. G. C. Anderson in *CAH* X 274 describes the purpose of Gaius' supposed visit to Egypt as "perhaps merely to gain personal knowledge of the most important economic dependency of Rome;" and he finds implausible explanations like Gardthausen's above. Magie at I 482 mentions, but does not analyze, a visit to Egypt by Gaius in 1 B.C. For a recent example, Syme (above, note 5) 10 says: "[Gaius] entered on office in Syria, and subsequently went to Egypt and to Arabia. Here begins the perplexity. That there should be no trace of this journey in Velleius Paterculus, that was only to be expected."

<sup>22</sup>In *templo dei tunc sancto et celebri* and *pravo usus iudicio* are polemical differences that need not detain us.

still in the East; *per eum* could draw us to the official correspondence. There are several references to such correspondence: between Phrataces and Augustus as we have seen, between Tiberius and Augustus (cf. Suet. *Tib.* 11.4–5 and 12.3) and possibly between Tiberius and Gaius (cf. Suet. *Tib.* 13.2). More importantly, in the second century A.D. Aulus Gellius quoted from a volume of letters between Gaius and Augustus (15.7.3) and *per eum* may derive ultimately from this collection and immediately from its tradition in a second source.<sup>23</sup> That Orosius had at hand another source, at least a *breviarium* of Roman history, is not seriously questionable. If he depended on it here, it cannot have had details.

Few, if any, would go to lengths to justify Orosius' information and to defend the tradition in which he is working; yet an elaborate argument of this sort is needed to support the *communis opinio* about Gaius' alleged visit to Egypt. Nor does Orosius simply state that Gaius visited Egypt but rather that he governed it, and Syria too, *ad ordinandas Aegypti Syriaeque provincias*. Gaius' commission was not to govern Egypt,<sup>24</sup> or even Syria for that matter,<sup>25</sup> although nothing in the claim, so far as Orosius knew, conflicted with Suetonius' description of Gaius as *Orienti praepositum* (Suet. *Tib.* 12.2). *Ordinare* cannot, however Orosius may have meant it, be interpreted in its technical sense. The eventual negotiations with Phrataces, conducted from a Syrian base camp, will explain one misinterpretation but the other is not so simplistic.

Because of Egypt's peculiar status as a province, Gaius neither assumed office nor appeared there as consul. Had he ever been in Egypt at any time, we would hear of it in connection with Germanicus' unapproved visit in A.D. 19. *Ab Aegypto*, then, appears in Orosius' text as an inference from Suetonius' *Iudaeum praeterevehens*, perhaps due to the latter's remarks about Augustus and Apis.<sup>26</sup> Orosius varies a set phrase, *ad ordinandas Aegypti Syriaeque provincias*, to invent information about Gaius.

<sup>23</sup>This letter, written on Augustus' sixty-fourth birthday, 23 September A.D. 1, points to others that belonged to this period. Interestingly Augustus expresses no concern about Parthia, but then the new diplomatic direction had been clear for some time even if the treaty was still unsigned.

<sup>24</sup>Our list of Egyptian prefects gives one, P. Octavius, between 2/1 B.C. and 19 February A.D. 3; cf. O. Reinmuth, "A Working List of the Prefects of Egypt, 30 B.C.–299 A.D." *BASP* 4 (1967) 76–77, and P. Brunt, "The Administrators of Roman Egypt," *JRS* 65 (1975) 142.

<sup>25</sup>R. Syme, "The Titulus Tiburtinus," *Vestigia* 17 (1973) 601, has revived the suggestion "that in fact Lollius and Quirinius were in succession the imperial legates of Syria from 1 B.C. to A.D. 3."

<sup>26</sup>Egypt is properly called a province, so Brunt (above, note 24) 124, note 1. Gaius' disregard of Jerusalem passed as ordinary policy in not paying undue cult to local gods (hence

Orosius did not likely depend on a second source, much less a good one, to make a point as polemical as the one here. Gaius' disregard of Jerusalem, Orosius believes, caused a devastating famine; reporting Augustus' indifference to Apis would have undermined this causal relationship. Orosius was at pains to restrict what his reader could learn about Egypt and his evidence may be discounted because it does not go beyond Suetonius.

To return to Gaius' Arabian campaign: not long after 1 January A.D. 1 Gaius campaigned as consul near Egypt. After the encounter he skirted the Egyptian border, returning to the coast where he boarded a Syria-bound ship on which he passed Judaea from the direction of Egypt.<sup>27</sup> Gaius' first campaign had been given every chance of success, yet was difficult enough to test his mettle. The significance of this campaign for Gaius' career is not diminished if Augustus alone counted a *salutatio imperatoria* after it.<sup>28</sup> Success in Arabia Petraea brought Gaius the necessary military dignity to conclude the Armenian settlement, to which he might now have turned but for the lingering recalcitrance of Phrataces.

## PARTHIA

Augustus had turned the Parthian problem over to Gaius and his general staff at some time after his son's consulship began, perhaps only when Gaius had completed his *expeditio Arabica*. The latest intelligence about Parthia reached Gaius on landing in Syria; likewise news of the consul's arrival passed quickly to Phrataces, for seasoned troops would soon be returning from the Gulf of <sup>c</sup>Aqaba. The Armenian issue might now be broached between Gaius and Phrataces.

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Suetonius' mention of the Apis incident). Ordinarily a Roman of Gaius' prestige might have participated in the Temple-cult at Jerusalem as Marcus Agrippa had done in 15 B.C. (Joseph. *AJ* 16.12–15, 55, and *Leg.* 294–97). Perhaps Augustus was approving a slight toward Herod's son Archelaus; cf. E. M. Smallwood, *The Jews under Roman Rule* (Leiden 1976) 89, note 99, and 117.

<sup>27</sup>*Iudaeum praetervehens* ought to mean "sailing by Judaea," cf. *Puteolanum sinum praetervehenti* (Suet. *Aug.* 98.2). Orosius, like other commentators, apparently took Suetonius' phrase as implying a one-way passage; this led to speculation that Gaius arrived in Egypt directly from Cyprus; but his presence in Cyprus is at best uncertain, cf. Romer (above, note 2) 202, note 39.

<sup>28</sup>Augustus' fifteenth imperial salutation is later than June 2 B.C. (*CIL* XII 5668, cf. *Ann. Ep.* 1952, no. 166) and prior to July A.D. 2 (*CIL* X 3827). Barnes (above, note 4) 23, citing Sen. *ad Polyb.* 15.4, Dio 55.10a.6 and *CIL* X 3827, argues that Augustus' fifteenth salutation cannot be referred to the Armenian campaign because it did not begin until after Lucius died on 20 August A.D. 2; he associates it with Gaius' Arabian campaign. R. Syme, *Danubian Papers* (Bucharest 1971) 39, associates Augustus' fifteenth with a Danubian campaign in 1 B.C. or A.D. 1 by a legate of Illyricum.

The epitomator's *ὑπατεύοντα* at Dio 55.10a.4 does not specify whether Gaius was beginning his consulship or acting as a consul later in the year (above, note 19).<sup>29</sup> This news, however, combined with continuing factiousness in Parthia to make Phrartaces more conciliatory. (He would soon be overthrown.) Either Gaius' assumption of the consulship or his availability later in the year could have influenced Phrartaces to change diplomatic directions. An aggressive foreign policy cannot be reversed at once and, although war was not inevitable (cf. Dio 55.10.20–21 and 55.10a.4), peace was not concluded before the end of summer A.D. 2. So tenuous was the eastern peace during Gaius' consulship that when a rebellion of some size broke out in Germany, only a minor action was carried on (Dio 55.10a.2–3; cf. Vell. 2.100.1). Available troops were alerted for emergency duty in the East.

Late in A.D. 2 Gaius was preparing for war when his brother's death was announced in camp (Sen. *ad. Polyb.* 15.4).<sup>30</sup> Domestic unrest caused Phrartaces to seek an immediate end of the imminent war against Rome (Dio 55.10a.4). A meeting was arranged in late September or early October<sup>31</sup> between these *duo . . . ementissima imperiorum et hominum . . . capita* (Vell. 2.101.2). Velleius' language captures the legal equality (cf. *imperiorum*) and *de facto* recognition of Phrartaces that the treaty brought.

<sup>29</sup>For those who did not know Merkelbach's emendation of *IGR* IV 248 (above, note 14), there was no difficulty in putting Gaius' arrival in Syria as late as autumn A.D. 1. It used to be believed that Gaius was called consul here instead of the more likely consul-designate. Thus K. M. T. Atkinson, "The Governors of the Province of Asia in the Reign of Augustus," *Historia* 7 (1958) 318, has Gaius and Tiberius clash at Samos during the former's consulship.

<sup>30</sup>Debevoise (above, note 5) 150 with note 30 misread his Seneca: "Gaius is said to have died in the midst of preparations for a Parthian war . . ." Neither J. G. C. Anderson, *CAH* X 275, nor J. E. G. Zetzel, "New Light on Gaius Caesar's Eastern Campaign," *GRBS* 11 (1970) 266, fully considers Seneca's remark when suggesting early A.D. 2 for the Euphrates conference (below, note 31). Woodman (above, note \*) 126 *ad* Vell. 2.101.1 *iuvēne* is wrong to agree with Magie (above, note 3) II 1345, note 46, in thinking the date of this conference uncertain. Syme (above, note 5) 11 puts the Euphrates conference "in the winter of A.D. 1/2, and hardly later than the spring of 2."

<sup>31</sup>L. Caesar died on 20 August A.D. 2 (so *CIL* XI 1420 = *ILS* 139 as discussed by Gardthausen [above, note 11] II 737, note 40). But the report of his death did not reach his brother for about forty days or more. Similar news of the utmost importance, that of Gaius' own death eighteen months later, was given the same priority by the imperial post and traveled the shorter distance from Limyra in Lycia to Pisa in Italy after forty days, cf. *CIL* XI 1421 = *ILS* 140 as discussed by A. M. Ramsay, "The Speed of the Imperial Post," *JRS* 15 (1925) 72. The distance from Marseilles where Lucius died to an unspecified point in Syria exceeds that from Limyra to Pisa. Even allowing for seasonal variance in the speed of travel, word of Lucius' death did not reach Gaius until mid-September, perhaps not much before October, A.D. 2 at which time he was still preparing for a Parthian war.

Velleius Paterculus himself, serving as military tribune during the conference, leaves the only details of the formalities (2.101.1–3). The armies camped along the line of demarcation, the Romans on the western bank of the Euphrates, the Parthians on the eastern. Negotiating parties of equal size met by day on a neutral island in full view of both armies.<sup>32</sup> The duration of the conference is not recorded, but two days were required for what look like official celebrations at its conclusion. On one evening Phrtaaces was banqueted among the Romans and on the next Gaius among the Parthians. Dio adds (55.10a.4) that in exchange for a secure border along the Euphrates, Phrtaaces ceded the Roman claims in Armenia and ceased to demand the return of his half-brothers. The peace was again very much on Roman terms; once Phrtaaces' demands which had precipitated the crisis were withdrawn, things stood legally in A.D. 2 much as they had in 2 B.C. before the coup in Parthia.

To demonstrate good faith Phrtaaces also alleged malfeasance of M. Lollius (Vell. 2.102.1), Augustus' handpicked *comes et rector* for Gaius (above, note 11). Lollius was reportedly in the pay of local rulers although this was not the most serious charge against him. His alleged intentions were more damning. The veracity of the charges is not proven but Lollius, expelled from Gaius' camp, turned up dead a few days later. Whether death came by his own hand or another's or by chance has never been known.<sup>33</sup> Perhaps between the time of Phrtaaces' allegations and of Lollius' death, Gaius, freed from his *rector's* influence, agreed to Tiberius' return from Rhodes (Suet. *Tib.* 13.2).

## ARMENIA

Although Phrtaaces withdrew direct support, the Parthian-aligned faction in Armenia, even with its platform jeopardized by his concessions, refused to disarm following the Euphrates agreement. Armenia was divided between a submissive majority more or less open to the Roman nominee and a Parthian-aligned nationalist opposition commanded by a

<sup>32</sup>G. V. Sumner, "The Truth About Velleius Paterculus: Prolegomena," *HSCP* 74 (1970) 266, may exaggerate: "It is clear from his description . . . that Velleius was on the island himself, enjoying a panoramic view as a member of the parade of honor." The geography of Velleius' vantage point cannot be so precisely deduced from his words.

<sup>33</sup>Pliny *HN* 9.118 and Vell. 2.97.1 on Lollius' rapacity. Vell. 2.102.1 refers broadly to *M. Lollii . . . perfida et plena subdoli ac versuti animi consilia*. Lollius' treasonous intentions, motivated by or motivating his rapacity in the East, conceivably explain his attempt to dominate Gaius at Samos (Suet. *Tib.* 12.3). In the latter passage above Velleius is also puzzled by the cause of death (I have added a third choice); Bowersock (above, note 5) 24 accepts his puzzlement as genuine, so too Sumner (above, note 32) 266–67 with note 62.

certain Addôn<sup>34</sup> with headquarters at Artagira.<sup>35</sup> Without Phrataces' support, however, the nationalist rebellion could be stopped. Addôn's decision to continue the fight marks the formal opening of Gaius' Armenian campaign. The new treaty allowed for Roman activity in Armenia but the lateness of the season (September/October) and the harshness of Armenian winters (below, note 40) likely delayed Gaius' departure until spring.

Minor engagements with the rebels brought Roman victories (Vell. 2.102.2; cf. Dio 55.10a.5–6) in the spring and summer of A.D. 3, but none was decisive until the fall of Artagira. Addôn summoned Gaius to a personal meeting (Florus 2.32.44–45)<sup>36</sup> on the pretext of revealing secrets of Phrataces (Dio 55.10a.6)—a list of treasure hoards, *thensaurorum rationes*, Florus would have us believe. Scholars usually assume that Artagira had been under siege for some time and Addôn's ruse was an attempt to break it. From the *fasti Cuprenses* (CIL IX 5290) 9 September emerges as the turning point and the entry in the *fasti* has been restored thus: *bellum cum [hostibus p. R. gerens] in Armenia percuss[us est dum obsidet Ar]ta[g]iram Ar[meniae oppidum]*.<sup>37</sup>

Gaius' general staff no doubt regarded this meeting as preliminary to Addôn's surrender, since the Parthian secrets represented his negotiating strength and were meant to be taken, like Phrataces' denunciation of Lollius the preceding year, as a sign of good faith. The precautions of the Euphrates conference were not repeated, perhaps because of Gaius' naivety in trusting his enemy or because P. Sulpicius Quirinius simply proved unimportant after the expulsion and death of his predecessor, Lollius.

<sup>34</sup>Addôn is the spelling of Dio 55.10a.6; our text of Strabo 11.14.6 gives Adôr, perhaps a scribe's slip for Adôn. The name is Latinized as Adduus in Vell. 2.102.2, as Dones in Florus 2.32.44 and as Donnes in Festus 19.3 where Florus may be misrepresented.

<sup>35</sup>Dio 55.10a.5 and Vell. 2.102.2 show that the Artagira campaign followed the Euphrates conference; Dio 55.10a.6 identifies the Armenian enemy by his Parthian alignment and is supported by Florus 2.32.42–44. Debevoise (above, note 5) 149–50 calls Addôn “perhaps the satrap set over the territory by the Parthian king.” This is based on Festus 19.3 whose expression *Donnes quidam, quem Parthicis Arsaces praeposuerat* may be embellishing his source, Florus, cf. J. W. Eadie, *The Breviarium of Festus* (London 1967) 135; it would not be the only inaccuracy in Festus' version: C. Caesar is there called Claudius Caesar.

<sup>36</sup>Florus has the details and Festus 19, derived from him, adds nothing. Florus' rhetorical account does not contradict the summary in Dio 55.10a.6–7.

<sup>37</sup>On the date: *fasti Cuprenses* give month and day; Zetzel (above, note 30) 261, note 3, has the year (which can be supplemented by our argument [above, note 31] dating the Euphrates conference late in A.D. 2). V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones, *Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Augustus and Tiberius* (Oxford 1974<sup>2</sup>) 39, print the entry as here; other emendations are possible.

Addôn's invitation was bait and Gaius was careless.<sup>38</sup> The enemy's sword struck Gaius as he was distracted by a document that Addôn had handed him (Florus 2.32.44). Dio 55.10a.6–7, Vell. 2.102.2 and Florus 2.32.44 agree that Addôn himself struck the blow. In any case, the redoubled efforts of the Roman army ended the campaign soon after<sup>39</sup> and the city's walls were razed (Strabo 11.14.6). Dio also thought that Addôn had escaped temporarily but was slain when Artagira fell. (Because of a lacuna in the text, Florus' version is not clear on this point.) Needless to say, Augustus' appointee, Ariobarzanes, was installed on the Armenian throne but did not last long (Aug. *RG* 27; Dio 55.10a.7; Tac. *Ann.* 2.4).

Gaius' wound was serious and ultimately fatal. He recovered temporarily or gave the appearance of recovery: *recreatus est ex vulnere in tempus* (Florus 2.32.45). The wound had weakened him and, according to our evidence, his mind wandered (Vell. 2.102.2; Dio 55.10a.8) although it is not convincing that this last means anything more than Gaius' wish to give up public life. The *salutatio imperatoria* (Dio 55.10a.7) brought no consolation when it came.<sup>40</sup>

Weak and disillusioned, Gaius returned to Syria where discipline in camp succumbed to his greedier hangers-on and his unhappiness was exploited for private gain. Augustus reportedly executed his son's *paedagogus* and certain other retainers for ravaging the province during his infirmity and after his death (Suet. *Aug.* 67.2). This captures the tenor in camp after Artagira (cf. Vell. 2.102.3). Previously Gaius had run a tight camp—the cases of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (above, note 11) and M. Lollius are instructive—but after Artagira Gaius was remote and determined to quit public life. Encouraged by self-serving members of his staff, he tried to retire and to remain *in ultimo ac remotissimo terrarum orbis angulo* (Vell. 2.102.3), i.e., in Syria where he was (Dio 55.10a.8).

The appearance and report of his son's health was an important consideration for Augustus. Gaius' request to be exempted from public

<sup>38</sup>Velleius' *temere* (2.102.2) may be meant judgmentally, not descriptively; he is considering the aftermath, not Gaius' disposition at the time of the meeting. Still the wound speaks for itself.

<sup>39</sup>Dio 55.10a.6 says Addôn went on to resist for quite some time; Strabo 11.14.6 speaks of a long siege but does not indicate when it began; Florus 2.32.45 knew that Gaius was still living when Addôn died. Since "the campaigning season in Armenia ended about October" (J. G. C. Anderson, *CAHX* 276, note 3) and since Gaius died the following February, we may imagine a siege that lasted no more than two months after the attack on Gaius; and the Roman command, pressed by its error and the coming winter, is not likely to have taken all that much time. Besides, Addôn's ruse appears desperate.

<sup>40</sup>This was Augustus' sixteenth, cf. above, note 28.

responsibilities met the *princeps*' displeasure but could not be ignored. Augustus personally conveyed it to the senate and insisted on one stipulation: Gaius must return to Italy first (Dio 55.10a.8). The *princeps* was naturally solicitous for his son's well-being and will have required his return only when his health allowed (unless Gaius had already, for whatever reasons, assured him of his recuperation). The recovery of the invalid was prerequisite to Augustus' consent and the report of Gaius' good health spread through the cities of the empire as the courier passed.<sup>41</sup>

Even if Florus is strictly inaccurate in phraseology and Gaius merely appeared to have recovered, still the news in the West was of his recuperation, that he was healthy. A number of medical possibilities will explain the appearance of recovery, if Gaius was not simply pretending,<sup>42</sup> and we may be sure Gaius' supposed recuperation implies no Tacitean (or Gravesian) *novercae Liviae dolus* (Tac. *Ann.* 1.3).<sup>43</sup>

Finally, in January or February A.D. 4, after corresponding with Rome, Gaius, *diu deinde reluctatus invitatusque* (Vell. 2.102.3), renounced his command, boarded a merchantman and sailed for home (Dio 55.10a.9). Complications of his wound perhaps forced his debarking at Limyra in Lycia where he died on 21 February.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>41</sup>The date of an inscription from Messenia (*SEG* 23 [1968] no. 206), first uncovered in 1960, may be at issue here. It reports the interruption of Caesarean games by news that Γάϊον . . . τοῖς βαρβάροις μαχόμενον ὑγιαίνειν τε καὶ κινδύνους ἐκφυγόντα ἀντιτετιμωρῆσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους. Even if correct, Zetzel's (above, note 30) lexical arguments about ὑγιαίνειν and κινδύνους ἐκφυγόντα do not preclude their application to the Artagira campaign, granted Florus' *recreatus est ex vulnere in tempus*. The terminology could refer to the outcome of the Artagira campaign when Gaius' health was a political issue. Zetzel does not consider the appearance, real or sham, of Gaius' recuperation and we may therefore disagree that ὑγιαίνειν *necessitates* a belief "that Gaius was not wounded at the time, and thus that the inscription was not written after Artagira" (Zetzel 264). The terminology could equally apply to the period after the Parthian negotiation of A.D. 2.

<sup>42</sup>So I have been assured by R. Weingarten, M.D. (Palo Alto, California). The surface wound could heal leaving internal complications, particularly if the wound was to the head. Other kinds of wounds are not precluded nor are personality factors. Since Gaius' desire to withdraw was strong, a show of improving health was needed for his general staff who had their own access to the diplomatic pouch.

<sup>43</sup>This is the only alternative Zetzel (above, note 30) 264 allows to his own argument.

<sup>44</sup>On the circumstances and place of death: Vell. 2.102.3 (of disease at Limyra, in Lycia); Dio 55.10a.8–9 (apparently of an illness from the wound, at Limyra in Lycia); Suet. *Aug.* 65.1 (in Lycia). For the date, *CIL* XI 1421 (= *ILS* 140) and *CIL* XIV 2801 (*fasti Gabini*). Tac. *Ann.* 1.3 calls Gaius *vulnere invalidum* when he died; *CIL* XI 1421 also mentions *volneribus pro re publica exceptis* and death in Limyra, cf. also *CIL* IX 5290 (*fasti Cuprenses*). Florus 2.32.42 and Festus 19 agree that the wound was the cause of death but wrongly put the place of his demise in Syria.



In late March when Gaius' death was announced at Rome, a public mourning was declared until his remains reached the mausoleum.<sup>45</sup> The corpse of the *princeps designatus* (CIL XI 1421 = ILS 140), if we may call him that, was accompanied by the military tribunes, perhaps including Velleius Paterculus, who were successively joined by the *principes* of the cities through which the funeral train passed (Dio 55.12.1). A new display in the Curia marked the public loss: Gaius' silver shield and lance, bestowed by the *ordo equester* with the title *princeps iuventutis*, were set out with his brother's (Dio 55.12.1).

### CONCLUSION

The rhetoric of 2 B.C., the year of Gaius' departure for the East, stirred romantic notions of Parthians, Medes and Armenians. Gaius' *expeditio Arabica* was ignored in the propaganda of that year and, though but a minor campaign by every yardstick we can apply, probably would have involved greater personal risk than any expected in Armenia. Yet even this risk was minimal. Augustus' precautions had included a preliminary report on the geography of the East and the appointed companionship of a learned observer, already familiar with local conditions, who would write a history of the Arabian campaign (above, note 11). This historical advertisement by Juba II of Mauretania would accompany Gaius back from even grander glory in Armenia where he would secure the throne for the Roman nominee.<sup>46</sup> In time, however, Phrataces made of the Parthian and Armenian issues what Augustus had said they were. Gaius' unexpected death after Artabazus eclipsed the expedition into Arabia Petraea because after this Juba's official account was not allowed to circulate widely.

<sup>45</sup>Ramsay (above, note 31) 72 for the approximate date the news arrived in Rome; CIL IX 5290 (*fasti Capuenses*) for the declared *iustitium* and the mausoleum. The epitomator at Dio 79.24.3 says that in A.D. 217 the corpse of Julia Domna remained briefly in the tomb of C. and L. Caesar, apparently a separate building that held the bodies before cremation after which urns with the ashes would have been deposited in the mausoleum.

<sup>46</sup>"It was a mark of honour for a consul to be addressed during his term of office by an author (cf. Virg. *Ecl.* 4 to Pollio, Hor. *C.* 1.4 to Sestius) . . .," so Woodman (above, note \*) 127 *ad* Vell. 2.101.3. See, too, his other references *ibid.* and the overlapping discussion in his "Questions of Date, Genre, and Style in Velleius: Some Literary Answers," *CQ* 25 (1975) 274. From the latter, *mutatis mutandis*, we may also compare: "Velleius for his part is able to dignify his work by constant references to an illustrious consul whose relative youth allows Velleius' narrative to assume at the same time an authoritative tone, much as in the case of Lucretius' address to Memmius. To a politician like Vincius it would clearly be advantageous if he were regularly mentioned in a history which gave such strong support to Tiberius." Juba's *scriptis voluminibus de eadem expeditione Arabica* (Pliny, *HN* 6.141) may be added to the standard list of works addressed to consuls in office.